The collapse of peace talks between the Ethiopian regime and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) last month begs the question; can Ethiopia’s mounting political problems be resolved, peacefully, through negotiation?
Zenawi’s successor, Hailemariam Desalegn, declared that he would not deviate from the path charted by the “Great Leader” dispelling any notion that the ruling party would open up the political process following the death of its longest-serving leader.
By so doing Desalegn has in effect become Meles redux. He did not stop there: Desalegn added that he would never tire of glorifying his former boss. In fact, in his first address to the rubber-stamp parliament last month, he went to the extent of copying Zenawi, at times, word for word. The new premier issued threat after threats against a sundry of opponents using the very favorite metaphors of his mentor such as “cutting limbs” and “being burned by getting too close to the fire.” Zenawi would laugh in his graves, as he did not do much when alive, seeing his reincarnation under the name of Desalegn.
That is why it’s instructive to talk about the party’s style of negotiation to provide background to the ill-fated Ogaden talks—until the real Desalegn, if there ever was such a man, emerges and the poor guy becomes his own man, which may never be the case.
Annihilation or Negotiation?
Every organization is stamped at inception with a genetic code that forms its culture. A good deal of EPRDF’s, Ethiopia’s ruling party, behaviors have their roots in the formative stages of the TPLF, the dominant group in the four-party coalition. The earliest memory of TPLF negotiating with another group was with the Tigrean Liberation Front (TLF) – a rebel outfit that preceded it. Fighters of the TLF were invited to a dinner to celebrate the inking of a merger agreement. After receiving an entertainment appropriate for the occasion, the guests were invited to pass the night by getting to know their assigned minders. When the night dawned into day, all the guests were slaughtered, remarkably in cold-blood and while sound asleep.
With the TLF out of the way, TPLF’s wrath turned to the monarchist Ethiopian Democratic Union and the leftist Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary party (EPRP). The two were asked to leave Tigray from where they carried out operations against the military junta, known as the Dergue. Fighting the same enemy and ascribing to the same Marxist ideology, the EPRP in particular sought accommodation from and collaboration with TPLF. The TPLF did not outright rule out any negotiations. When the negotiations led nowhere, TPLF attacked in full force, driving the two out of Tigray.
From Rebel to a Dominant-Party Government
The first time the EPRDF formally went to the negotiating table was at the Rome talks of 1990. With the TPLF emboldened by an overwhelming military victory against the Dergue at the battle of Shire and the Dergue not yet sobered of its intoxication with the humongous military might still under its disposal, no progress was and could be made.
The last time the EPRDF went to the negotiation table as a rebel was at the London meeting of May 1991. The London conference, organized by UK under the leadership of US Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen, a week before the TPLF moved into Ethiopia’s capital, collapsed before it even started when the EPRDF unilaterally moved into the capital and subsequently formed a transitional government. As a prelude to the Addis Ababa conference of June 1991, the TPLF held back-door negotiations with some of its opponents, mainly the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), to hammer out the principles that would govern the transition. These informal talks broke down at many points due to TPLF’s intransigence and it’s disinclination to show any flexibility on its desire to monopolize state power.
But because public euphoria was great, the opposing parties somehow swallowed their pride to accept a degrading low position of playing second fiddle in the interest of giving their constituents, who were too eager for peace, respite from endless conflicts that went on for generations. When these parties insisted on respecting and acting by the minimum spirits contained in the agreements signed, one of which was free and fair elections, they were eliminated one after another. Their supporters were brutally hunted down and eliminated. To this day, Ethiopian jails are over flooded with those accused of being associated with OLF. Some of these prisoners have been in detention for as long as the TPLF ruled the country.
The Ethio-Eritrean War: The Price of Failed Negotiations
The war was not only unexpected but also an instance of EPRDF’s failure to solve minor border differences with a former comrades in arms. Granted, the Eritrean ruling party was (and is) known for its stubbornly militaristic stances, The fact is good-faith negotiation could have prevented the death of 120,000, who perished fighting over a worthless piece of land whose main produce is grass for stray animals, dirt that swallows all human construction, and stones unfit for building. With the war disastrously concluded, the two warring sides accepted international arbitration. Yet again Meles’ TPLF refused to comply with the decision of the arbitrators. Thanks to this stubborn distaste for compromise, the two poor countries are forced to maintain over-sized armies and engage in proxy wars that continue to destabilize the region.
As an External War Ends, Internal War Begins
After the conclusion of the Ethio-Eritrean war, the Central Committee of the TPLF sat down for a three-month long evaluation. The Committee was split on the future direction of the country and the manner in which the execution of the war plan was abruptly halted. Siye Abraha, formerly minister of defense, and a few others, who also had the backing of the majority of members, faulted Meles for prematurely curtailing Ethiopia’s lightening advance inside uncontested Eritrean territory and finishing the objective of the oppression: Getting rid of Isaias and recovering the port city of Assab for landlocked Ethiopia.
Meles waited until his ranks swelled. When it did, he stunned everyone by swiftly expelling his opponents from the very party they helped build. Overnight, he achieved total dominion over the party. In an act of vengeance, he threw Siye and his brothers into jail accusing them of corruption under an nonexistent law. In all of these dealings, Meles did not seek compromise but total annihilation of the other faction.
After the war, the only opposition left in the system was a few Southern groups, particularly from the Hadiya zone where the regime faced the most serious opposition. Back and forth negotiations were conducted to resolve differences—having to do with EPRDF’s failure to abide by the very laws it made. The opposition won local elections but was prevented from governing. TPLF’s refusal to play by its own rules eventually drove about 50,000 Hadiyas into exile.
Following the disputed 2005 elections, the EPRDF sat down with opposition groups at the urging of the European Union. The negotiations failed to forestall the killing of over 291 protesters. After a series of failed negotiations, EPRDF herded Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) negotiators into the Kaliti prison under exaggerated and outrageous charges of treason and crimes against humanity, including the intent to commit genocide. EPRDF made promises it had no intention to keep and only to break them when the circumstances turned in its favor. One such promise was Meles’ announcement to talk to OLF without any preconditions, a promise as short-lived as the threat that inspired it. The negotiations to seek the release of jailed CUD leaders served as the last straw in liquidating the so called “loyal” opposition.
Somalia: Another Foreign Adventure
EPRDF’S “victory” against its internal enemies soured relations with its American and European benefactors. It was on the heels of this that the EPRDF turned its gaze to an external enemy: The Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The 2006 invasion of Somalia was another example of failed negotiations and an adventure meant to repair strained relations with Western donors. The invasion of Somalia also had a domestic calculation. The EPRDF was worried that the reemergence of Somalia would serve as a staging ground for its opponents, mainly OLF and ONLF. Being one of the architects of the Somalia mess, there was no Somalia group from whom Meles did not have someone on his payroll. Somalia was his plaything. However, the ICU emerged out of Zenawi’s radar like CUD did at home during the 2005 elections. EPRDF’S negotiating strategy with the ICU was a mirror image of its domestic negotiation strategy: to exaggerate the threat and present it an existential danger to the country, propose total submission and threaten annihilation if that was rejected or a compromise plan was tabled.
A Parliament Cleansed of Opposition
The few members of opposition in the parliament made a big fuss about the Somalia invasion. They wanted to be formally briefed about the conduct of the war, to review war expenses, war casualties, and above all question the mission of the war. The ruling party was too annoyed by these questions that it decided to create a parliament without any opposition.
Come the 2010 election, the ruling party filled all but one of the 547 seats with its members. The disastrous election took place only a few months after the EPRDF negotiated and agreed with Hailu Shawel and Lidatu Ayalew, under the auspices of the European Union and US diplomats, to hold “spotless free and fair elections.” A picture that showed a towering Hailu Shawel bowing to the diminutive Zenawi represented the culmination of humiliating the opposition in the name of negotiation. The agreement was hailed as a turning point. Parties and personalities that stayed out were derided as spoilers. However, as he did time and again, EPRDF failed to abide by any of the terms of the agreement. Shawel would later lament on a VOA interview that he was profoundly angry, not for being defeated but for being so blatantly fooled.
Organizations Take on the Personality of their Leaders
EPRDF does sit down for negotiations–when and if it wanted to. But the outcome of the negotiation was often predetermined, always in its favor. Besides, for the ruling EPRDF total victory is not enough. The total elimination of the other party is the goal. Nothing short of that goal is acceptable. When it was not in a position to dictate the terms, EPRDF would refuse to negotiate. Then suddenly it makes gestures for negotiations, directly or through malleable intermediaries. But by this time its military or security forces are already ordered into action and have already decimated the opponent.
This behavior of the Ethiopian government is not limited to political opponents. Civic associations were not immune to EPRDF’s heavy-handed tactics. Two cases demonstrate the length to which the government goes to discredit and annihilate its opponents, even benign ones. The Ethiopian Labor Federation is an old organization. Most of its members were employees of the state. During the late 19990s, a majority worked at mega state farms established by the previous Dergue regime. Following economic liberalization under Meles, the farms were sold to regime cronies at dirt-cheap prices. The sales contracts did not include any concern for the fate of the low-paid workers who had to be laid off en mass. When the labor federation picked up their cases with the government, some of its leaders were co-opted with bribes and intimidation and others were forced to into exile, including the federation’s president, Dawe Ibrahim. Afterwards, the federation lost its independence and became just another government agency answerable to the whims of the ruling party.
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